












In the commentaries on the Isagoge Boethius supplies different ontological 
options about what can instantiate the terms of the relation of predication. 
The main actor playing a role in the solution of Porphiry’s problem are the 
similarities, entities that do not match any entry of the standard categorical 
system.2 Other ontological options are anyway present, in the commentaries 
on Porphyry and in other boethian works, as the commentary on Categories 
and the Theological Treatises. In this article I deal with these categorial settings, 
perhaps more platonic in some sense of the term. One cannot say that the 
various ontological charts are complementary or that the same things are 
catalogued once only, under the same label. On the contrary, objects such as 
forms, essences and material components can be considered from points of 
view that are different and not easily comparable. 
Ontology in some way constitutes a necessary preliminary to metaphysics, 
providing the pawns for playing different metaphysical games. This does not 
mean that one must play until the end of the game; he can chose to play for a 
while, to suspend his player positon, or do not take part in the game. To 
explain why for instance (every) man is white one has to know what the 
                                           
1 I am indebted to Dr. Caterina Tarlacci for his insightful suggestions and critical com-
ments. He, of course, bears no responsibility for any errors-omissions of mine. 
2 On this logical-ontological side, let me mention my works: PINZANI (2007); the second 
chapter of The history of the problem of universals from Boethius to John of Salisbury (which will 
be published shortly). 




expressions ‘man’ and ‘white’ stand for; then he can give a metaphysical 
account of the relation between man and being white. An explanation of 
ordinary predication does not constitute per se a metaphysical theory: I can 
say (and in fact Boethius says) that Socrates is white because whiteness is in 
Socrates and stop there. A semantic account of predication is in fact a neces-
sary but not sufficient condition for having a full metaphysical system. 
In Boethius it is difficult to find a direct connection between the logical anal-
ysis of predication and metaphysics. I explain myself with a negative exam-
ple about what we would need and have not. What we would like to find is 
an in-depth metaphysical analysis of the notion of similarity, an analysis for 
instance that allows to explain the truth of ‘every man is an animal’ on the 
basis of the fact that in things in which the similarity of being man is instanti-
ated, the similarity of being animal is also instantiated. Besides, we would 
like to know something more about the relation between similarities and 
individual things. However, Boethius does not take a clear position, nor 
move forward, apart from some observations on the different way in which a 
likeness can be and be understood. 
We expect too much from Boethius? Yes and no. Yes for the following rea-
son: Boethius is engaged in commenting (comments on) logical works of 
Aristotle in which - as we said - categorical entities are considered mostly in 
an abstract perspective. When in the commentaries on Porphyry Boethius 
must give up such abstract approach and take a stand, what he says consti-
tutes a minimal ontology. If we wonder about the limits within which a 
philosopher logically minded, but interested in metaphysical issues, must 
keep himself, an example worthy of attention is that of Russell. In all his 
work, mostly oriented to the construction of a logical-mathematical system, 




how could one answer the question: what is the metaphysical system of 
Russell? Perhaps, taking a cue from the writings on logical atomism, he could 
say that Russell’s world consists of individuals that are objects of immediate 
perception and general properties, providing in this way a faithful descrip-
tion of Rossell’s ontological stance.  
No, we do not ask Boethius too much, because one can be thrifty on the 
metaphysical plane but up to a point. It is not sufficient to provide an ontolo-
gy, it is also necessary to reflect and debate on how the entities brought up 
relate to each other. A realist philosopher, who believes that individuals and 
universal properties exist, should explain how these entities are combined 
with each other. If he says, as William of Champeaux (to take the most fa-
mous example) does, that several individuals have a relation of inherence 
with a universal property and this relationship has to be understood as 
physical presence of the universal in the particulars, then he has to explain 
other not easy things. From this point of view, we feel to ask Boethius, and 
even Russell, to be a little less reticent. 
 
 
2. Boethius’ classifications 
  
In the commentary on Categoriae, Boethius observes that Aristotle intended 
to make an inventory of meanings of expressions rather than things.3 howev-
                                           
3 BOETHIUS, In Cat., 162B – 162C : «Singulum aut substantiam significat, aut quantitatem. 
Quod si de rebus diuisionem faceret, non dixisset "significat"; res enim significatur, non 
ipsa significat. Illud quoque maximo argumento est Aristotelem non de rebus sed de 
sermonibus res significantibus speculari, quod ait: Singulum igitur eorum quae dicta sunt, 
ipsum quidem secundum se in nulla affirmatione dicitur, horum autem ad se inuicem 
complexione affirmatio fit. Res enim si iungantur, affirmationem nullo modo perficiunt, 




er,  our author  does not appear to be always clear about the distinction 
between things and meanings, distinction which will play a key role in the 
12th century commentaries. The categories are presented in the following text 
as an inventory of things in biunivocal correspondence with names: 
 
Everything is a substance, or a quantity, or a quality, or referred to other, or a 
doing, or an undergoing, or a when, or a where, or a having, or a place; there-
fore there will be as many expressions signifying these things, and this is the 
greatest division, to which nothing else can be added; the smallest division is 
the one into four classes: substance, accident, universal, particular. Indeed eve-
rything is a substance, or an accident, or universal, or particular. Just as nothing 
can be added to the ten classes mentioned, similarly nothing can be removed 
from these four. 4 
 
So, things are particular or universal, substances or accidents. The division 
between universals and particulars implies that universal things exist along-
side particulars. The second distinction leads us to consider a different cata-
logue from the one of categories: two large containers, the first one 
apparently coinciding with that of substances; the second one holding the 
nine little boxes remaining. However, things are a little more complicated 
than they appear to be, since, in the strict sense, the accident is defined as 
something that can either be or not be in the entity to which it inheres with-
out this latter ceases to be what it (essentially) is. However, something appar-
ently does not add up; for instance, the difference is not a substance, since its 
modality of predication is different from the substance, but neither is it a 
                                           
4 In Cat. 169C-D: «Omnis enim res aut substantia est, aut quantitas, aut qualitas, aut ad 
aliquid, aut facere, aut pati, aut quando, aut ubi, aut habere, aut situs; quocirca tot erunt 
etiam sermones qui ista significent, et haec est maxima diuisio, cui ultra nihil possit 
adiungi: paruissima uero est quae fit in quattuor, in substantiam et accidens, et uniuersale 
et particulare. Omnis enim res aut substantia est, aut accidens, aut uniuersalis, aut 





quality, as quality has an accidental nature.5 From this it should follow that a 
distinction exists between qualities within one of the nine categories of acci-
dent and qualities outside; thus, unless ambiguities exist, the distinction 
substance-accident does not exhaust the domain of categorial entities: 
 
In conclusion the difference is not only substance or quality, but what moulds 
the substantial quality from both, which remains in the nature of the subject, 
and, as it participates of the substance, is not an accident, as it is a quality, dif-
fers from substance. Therefore, it is a sort of intermediate thing between sub-
stance and quality.6 
 
Coming back to categories, let us see what kind of things Aristotle and Boe-
thius consider. The list of objects presented, with some omission, is the fol-
lowing: 
 
substance Aristarchus, Socrates, a 
particular tree, a 
particular horse, /man/, 
/horse/ /animal/ 
Quantity Two cubits, three cubits; 
'Cicero', /part of speech/, 
/syllable/, /speech/; 
/line/, /surface/, 
/body/; /time/; /place/; 
/length/, /width/, 
/height/; three, seven, 
/number/ 
                                           
5 In Cat. 192B: «Sed differentia substantia non est, idcirco quod si esset substantia non in 
eo quod quale sit de subiecto sed in eo quod quid sit praedicaretur. Qualitas uero solum 
non est, esset enim accidens et in subiecto». 
6 In Cat. 192B-C: «Concludendum est igitur differentiam, neque solum substantiam esse, 
neque solum qualitatem, sed quod ex utrisque conficitur substantialem qualitatem, quae 
permanet in natura subiecti, atque ideo quoniam substantia participat, accidens non est, 
quoniam qualitas est, a substantia relinquitur. Sed quoddam medium est inter 








/illness/, /health/, /that 
according to which 
something is said boxer 
or runner or healthy or 








triangular, being square. 




/servant/, /master (of a 
servant)/ 
where /being in the Lyceum/  
when  /yesterday/ 
Position /sitting/, /lying/ 
having /having shoes/, 
/having arms/ 
doing /cutting/, /burning/, 
/warming/, /cooling/,  
/entertaining/, 
/saddening/ 






The translation of Latin terms can vary significantly. In principle there are 
two possible interpretations of a Latin common noun: a distributive one and 
a ‘definite’ one. For example ‘homo’ can be translated into English with ‘a 
man’ or ‘(the) man’. Something similar happens with verbs and abstract 
nouns. Different languages have their own expressive means to distinguish 
between the two possible readings. In one of these interpretations, the com-
mon nouns exemplified on the right side of the table above stand for proper 
nouns of specific/generic entities. One can prefer a certain interpretation 
according to his own philosophical tastes and conjectures about Aristotle’s 
intentions. 
We adopt the typographical convention ‘/.../’ to maintain neutrality as to 
the possible readings of the Aristotelian-Boethian text. In some (few) cases it 
seem to me only one interpretation is possible, so the term should not occur 
between slashes. In other cases – involving abstract nouns and infinitive 
forms of verbs – I am in doubt: is there an acceptable sense according to 
which we can use terms such as ‘heat’ or ‘sitting’ distributively? One might 
think that such terms actually indicate a set of properties; personally I am 
inclined to think that such expressions are not normally utilized in this way, 
but, to account for ontologically less expansive interpretations, I have brack-
eted most of the abstract nouns and verbal phrases. 
I shall limit myself in what follows to some observations on entities belong-




Substances are common currency among medieval logicians. The normal 




linguistic possessing special properties such as ‘not allowing opposites’. 
However, the fact that a problem of universals does exist, and in particular of 
second substances, compels them to consider the common way of speaking 
critically when using the technical Latin language. 
Boethius glosses over the text where Aristotle emphasises the role of the 
individuals in this way: 
 
The same species /man/ and the genus /animal/ are considered in a unitary 
way only on the basis of the singular individuals.7 
 
Second substances are characterized in different ways: 
 
/man/ contains Socrates, i.e. a certain individual substance8 
Second substances are those in whose species lies what is called substance in 
the main sense.9 
The substance of individuals in its entirety is not in Socrates individual or in 
another singular man, but in all particular thing.10 
Genera and species are not obtained by abstraction from a singular thing, but 
from all singular individuals by a rational mental act.11 
 
At the end of the paragraph, Boethius completes the picture by quoting the 
metaphysical doctrine of the three substances: 
 
Given that there are three substances: matter, species (=form) and substance 
composed and united which constitutes itself from these things, Aristotle here 
                                           
7 In Cat., 182 C: «hominem quidem idem ipsam speciem, et animal, quod est genus, non 
nisi ex individuorum cognitione colligimus». 
8 In Cat., 183 A: «homo continet Socratem, id est aliquam individuam substantiam». 
9 In Cat., 183 B: «Secundae substantiae dicuntur in quibus speciebus illae quae 
principaliter substantiae dicuntur insunt». I prefer to translate ‘prima/ae substantia/ae’, 
‘secunda/ae substantia/ae’ as ‘first substance/s’, ‘second substance/s’ (instead of in the 
traditional ‘primary-secondary substance/s’) to emphasize the order relation that struc-
tures the category of substance. 
10 In Cat., 183 C: «Neque enim cuncta individuorum substantia in uno Socrate est, vel 
quolibet uno homine, sed in omnibus singulis». 
11 Ibid.: «Genera namque et species non ex uno singulo intellecta sunt, sed ex omnibus 




does not deal with the species only, nor the matter, but he considers both com-
posed and mixed together.12  
 
It is difficult to understand how these different characterizations can go 
together. Boethius does not say anything in this regard. The commentary on 
Categoriae, in particular the part on substance, is a ‘literal’ commentary, close 
to the text, devoid of technical subtleties and digressions. We do not have, as 
for other logical works, a second commentary in which the issues are ana-
lysed in further depth, also with the aid of secondary literature (i.e. the com-
mentaries of the schools of Athens and Alexandria).13 Some aspects are 
anyway rather interesting in view of the deeper analysis contained in other 
logical works. For example, issues such as predication, meaning of universal 
expressions, and categorial overlapping are considered.14 
As a logician Boethius has different ideas on the possible interpretation of 
Aristotle-Porphyry’s discourse; in the Theological treatises – in particular in 
the Contra Eutychen - he seems to accept a realist interpretation of second 
substances, which he calls subsistences, contrasting them – rather unexpect-
edly – with substances: 
                                           
12 In Cat., 184A: «Cum autem tres substantiae sint, materia, species, et quae ex utriusque 
conficitur undique composita et compacta substantia, hic neque de sola specie, neque de 
sola materia, sed de utrisque mistis compositisque proposuit». 
13 Boethius limits himself to quoting Archytas, Iamblichus and Themistius as adjunctive 
sources on the category issue in the comment preamble. (cf. In Cat., 162A). 
14 An element of a certain interest on this subject, but not consistent with the topic at 
issue, is constituted by the following reasoning: «if Aristarchus is a grammarian and 
Aristarchus is a man, it follows that /man/ is a grammarian». /man/, by Boethius’ 
admission, stands for the second substance (cf. In Cat., 182C-D: «Nam quoniam 
Aristarchus grammaticus est, homo uero est Aristarchus, est homo grammaticus: ita prius 
omne accidens in indiuiduum uenit, secundo uero loco etiam in species generaque 
substantiarum accidens illud uenire putabitur’)». The predication of the accident as 
regards second substances is not the standard and Boethius excludes it elsewhere (see the 
following text quoted). What Boethius has in mind is not completely clear to me, perhaps 






The Latin expressions equivalent to the Greek ‘ousiosin’ or ‘ousiosthai’ are ‘sub-
sistence’ or ‘subsist’; whereas ‘ypostasin’ or ypsistasthai correspond to our ‘sub-
stance’ or ‘stand under’. What does not need accidents in order to be subsists; 
what provides a sort of subject matter to other accidents so that they can be ca-
pable of being stands under; it is actually under them as long as it is subject to 
accidents. So genera and species subsist only, indeed accidents do not affect 
genera and species. Besides, not only do individuals subsist, they also stand 
under, indeed they too do not need accidents in order to be (actually they are 
moulded by the differences and their own proper qualities), and lend them-
selves to the accidents so that these can be, as far as they are subject.15 
 
Second substances and God satisfy the condition stated for subsisting 
things; it is not clear if the same holds for the accidents (particular and uni-
versal) and what having subsistence means for substantial individuals. From 
a certain point of view, accidents can be seen as something that does not need 
other accidents to be what they are, but if it were so, the concept of subsist-
ence would apply to any kind of entity.16 As for substantial individuals, as 
well as for God, Boethius clearly states they have subsistence, but how must 
we interpret this? God – as is usually characterized – does not have accidents, 
neither does He need them. 
                                           
15 BOETHIUS, Contra Eutychen, 88, 42-55: «Nam quod Graeci ousiosin vel ousiosthai dicunt, 
id nos subsistentiam vel subsistere appellamus; quod vero illi ypostasin vel ypsistasthai, id 
nos substantiam vel substare interpretamur. Subsistit enim quod ipsum accidentibus ut 
possit esse non indiget. Substat autem id quod aliis accidentibus subiectum quoddam, ut 
esse valeant, subministrat; sub illis enim stat, dum subiectum est accidentibus. Itaque 
genera et species subsistent tantum; neque enim accidentia generibus et speciebus 
contingent. Individua vero non modo subsistent vero etiam substant, nam neque ipsa 
indigent accidentibus ut sint; informata enim sunt iam propriis et specificis differentiis, et 
accidentibus ut esse possint ministrant, dum sunt scilicet subiecta». 
16 The following text contrasts with this interpretation: «(the singular man) has an yposta-
sis or substance, because he functions as subject for other entities that are not subsistences, i.e. 
ousioseis.» (Rand, 90, 84-85) The consequence comes from the initial definition of subsist-
ence notion. However, it is not the only definition (/characterization) supplied by Boethi-
us. In a further passage we will comment soon, Boethius says that men have subsistence as 
they are not in any subject. The two definitions are quite different: the former says the 
subsistences do not need accidents, the latter that they are not accidents (that is the kind of 




Any singular man, on the other hand, is full of accidents; in order to claim 
he can do without them, one must consider individual substance or its kernel, 
as something invariant at different times and under different circumstances. 
If individuals are effectively invariant and their names a kind of rigid desig-
nators, to say that a subsistence has substance would mean it allows accidents 
but does not undergo any essential modification. In the case of God, to say 
that He is a substance would involve to admit that He could, at least in prin-
ciple, bear accidental determinations. Boethius copes by suggesting that God, 
presiding everything, is also, in a sense, the foundation (thus the substance) 




Boethius does not supply a suitable classification of quantities; he simply 
says that quantities have to do with numbers, precisely the rather sibylline 
formulation is: «Definita quantitas est quae alicuius termino numeri coercetur», 
which I would translate as «quantity in the strict sense of term is what is 
delimited by a numeric limit». If this sentence means that quantity is whatev-
er is coupled with a number, quantities could be either numbers or numera-
ble (orderable) things. These aspects apart, there are different sorts of things 
associable with a number: for instance, to limit ourselves to the Aristotelian 
examples, things in whose expression a number occurs (such as one metre, or 
                                           
17 Of course, the point is in what sense one speaks of God: we can speak of God in the 
unitary sense or in the sense of the three persons, at least one of whom had human nature. 
There exists a difficulty in the terminology; as L. Obertello explains: «per quanto singolare 
la dizione una essentia, traes substantiae, è data da Agostino come versione della classica 
forma dogmatica mia ousia, treis upostaseis (De Trinitate, V, VIII, 10); ma egli aggiunge che il 
nostro modo di esprimerci ha identificato essenza e sostanza, così che non si possa dire 
“una essenza e tre sostanze”, ma si debba invece dire “una essenza o sostanza e tre perso-




one hour), geometrical entities, bodies in a possibly non-geometrical sense, 
speeches. 
The presence of bodies among quantities poses some additional problem of 
categorial interference. Two possibilities are left open by the text of Categories: 
the first one is that quantitative bodies are a kind of abstract models of sub-
stantial (concrete) bodies, more similar to geometric solids than the things 
which fall under the senses; the second one is that the bodies are what they 
seem to be, that is world objects satisfying the conditions set for quantities. 
The former possibility is coherent with a view of categories as non-
communicant boxes; the latter – instead – sees the categories as structures 
differentiated by the conditions established rather than by the element ‘con-
tained’ in them.18 
If the lower elements in the category of quantity are not the things having a 
quantity, then the standard metre kept at the Breteuil pavilion in Sèvres is not 
a quantitative Urelement, but only a substance. We can think of the quantita-
tive particulars as material entities abstract from their non-quantitative fea-
tures:19 the metre intended as quantity is the metre of Sèvres minus most of its 
physical properties, for instance being in a specific place or being made of a 
                                           
18 In this regard H.G. Apostle observes how man is not divisible as such, but as a body 
(APOSTOLE (1952), p. 5). Book M of Metaphysics is usually quoted on this subject. I must 
confess I have some difficulty with this text. Apparently Aristotle maintains that a thing of 
the substance kind, for example Socrates, can be seen as a line or a number, quite apart 
from every irrelevant feature. I think it could be a form of radical indifferentism, but I do 
not know where it could lead: the medieval theory of non-difference (the specific man is 
non-different from Socrates) is rather complicated and exposed to all kind of criticism. 
According other interpreters Metaphysics M2 is explainable on the basis of the Aristotelian 
abstraction theory (cf. e.g. MULLER (1970), 52, 2, 156-171). 
19 Objects belonging to other categories of accident are conceivable in the same way. 
After all the abstractive process which allows to conceive a generic man is the same one 
which allows to conceive a material body. Just as we can say of the generic man that he is 
mortal but not he is born on a certain day, we can say that a material generic body has 




specific material. On the other hand, the material metre is in the right place in 
the category of substance as well as in that of quantity. The reason why it can 
be found in both categories is that it satisfies the conditions stated for sub-
stantial objects as well as those for quantities. This interpretation does not 
involve any stance on the ontological status of mathematical objects: material 
bodies share with numbers the feature of being countable or divisible; but 




Relatives are quite different things, also from a categorical point of view: 
‘servant’ refers to first substances, ‘double’ to a quantity, ‘position’ to a 
where. But Aristotle expressly denies that first substances must be included 
among relative things. In interpreting the text of Categories one can opt in 
favour of two easy ways out: 
a) Relatives are a sort of qualities (in the broadest sense of the term), there is 
not a relative which is a servant, but a particular relative property. 
b) Relative things must be considered in pairs. 
The former interpretative hypothesis is perhaps closer to the text, as relatives 
de facto are one of the accident categories, that is the kind of things that are in 
other (i.e. in a substance), but it has the defect of rendering unnatural the way 
Aristotle speaks – for instance – of master and servant, in contexts where 
what entertains a certain relationship does not actually seem to be a property. 
I see two possibilities again, a little more complicated or perhaps hazardous: 
c) When Aristotle speaks of substances, he is referring to something that 
must be taken together with certain specific relations, mainly that of predica-




linking things whose nouns are in some way connected. ‘Substance’ should 
be a term referring to objects as they belong to a certain categorial structure: if 
relations change, the structure changes, in other words, we call substances the 
elements of the SUBSTANCE, the same things – as elements of RELATIVES – are 
no longer called substances but relatives. The conclusive section of the chap-
ter on relatives however speaks against this interpretative hypothesis (cf. 
infra).  
d) There could be nothing ‘under’ the species of relatives (e.g. /servant/), 
differently from what happens in the case of /man/. This last proposal can 
help to explain why the servant is a relative and not a substance, but it per-
haps does not suffice in itself, if relative objects like /head/ can be thought as 
a kind of substance. (Indeed Aristotle says that it is not clear whether things 
such as the head are second substances or relatives: cf. Cat. 7, 8a, 20-30). 
What position does Boethius endorse on the issue of relative things? In the 
commentary on Categories there is not one interpretation only; it seems to me 
that three different ones can be isolated which present or suggest analogies 
with the possible readings listed above. Let us see what it is about: 
 
First interpretation: relative things must be considered in pairs. At the begin-
ning of the chapter dealing with relatives Boethius notes that Aristotle always 
speaks of pairs of relatives: 
 
For this reason Aristotle does not speak of a singular relative thing, but, in the 
plural, of more relative things, showing in this way how one does not under-
stand a relative thing in its simplicity but in plurality. 20 
 
                                           
20 In Cat., 217B: «Ideo non dixit Aristoteles: Ad aliquid uero tale dicitur sed, plurali 
numero, talia dicuntur, inquit, demonstrans relatiuorum intelligentiam non in simplicitate 




Boethius may be glossing here what Aristotle says in the Categories about the 
fact that relatives refer to each other, or suggesting that relatives are not 
singular objects but pluralities. 
 
Second interpretation: elements of different categories belong to the set (base) 
of RELATIVES. This thesis is formulated in a rather clear way in the following 
text: 
 
There is no reason to doubt that Socrates as Socrates is a substance, as father or 
son he is a relative; so, nothing prevents the same thing from being found under 
different genera, depending on different attributions. Disposition, virtue and 
vice behave in the same way. Disposition can be placed in QUALITY, as men 
from it are said to be qualified; indeed we say somebody is having since they 
have a certain disposition. Virtue is a quality too; for men are said <virtuous> 
[...] double and triple should be considered according to quantity.21 
 
Boethius is commenting a passage on contrariety, but unusually he goes 
well beyond the text. It is true that Aristotle speaks of virtue and science as a 
species of relatives, but he never says one can consider first substances as 
relatives; instead he says – as we anticipated – the exact opposite. The pas-
sage is the following: 
   
One wonders whether some substance can be said relative, as the case seems, 
perhaps for some second substance. As to first substances of course it is true 
that these and their parts cannot be said relative; indeed a certain man is not 
said that certain man of something, nor a certain ox is said that certain ox of 
something. The same holds for the parts, a certain hand is not said a certain 
hand of somebody, but someone’s hand; and a certain head not a head of some-
body, but someone’s head. Something of this kind occurs for second substances, 
                                           
21 In Cat., 220D – 221A: «nihil prohibet Socrates namque in eo quod est Socrates 
substantia est, in eo quod pater uel filius ad aliquid; ita ad aliud atque ad aliud ducta 
praedicatione eamdem rem sub diuerso genere nihil poni prohibet. Habitus quoque et 
uirtus et uitium eodem modo est. Potest enim in qualitate poni habitus quod ex eo quales 
homines nuncupentur, habentes enim dicimus aliquos rei habitus retinentes. Virtus 
quoque qualitas est idcirco quod ex eo [boni] homines dicuntur  […] Duplum et triplum 




or at least for most of them. For example /man/ is not said /man/ of some-
thing, nor /ox/ /ox/ of something, nor /wood/ /wood/ of something, but 
property of something. Thus it is clear that this sort of things is not relative; for 
some second substances however one may wonder if that is the case: as /head/ 
is said /head/ of somebody and /hand/ /hand/ of somebody, and so on. For 
this reason these substances seem relative.22 
 
I have translated Latin expressions such as ‘(quidam)(quaedam)(quoddam) aCN’ 
with ‘a certain...’. Due to the well known ambiguity of the Categories text, the 
descriptive expression can be understood as naming things or, metalinguisti-
cally, expressions. If we forget our convention /.../, what Aristotle says can 
be clarified by the following example: (the) man is not said man of some-
thing, as the single man, for instance Socrates, is not said relative to some-
thing; nor is the single head - let us call it ‘head sample n.125’ – said head 
sample 125 relative to something; however one could say – according to the 
text just quoted – that the head, generically understood, is a head of some-
body. 
 
Third interpretation: this position excludes categorial overlapping, for in-
stance between substances and relatives. Boethius seems to perceive that 
what is said in the last text quoted contrasts with its second interpretation 
(‘contra ea quae superius disputata sunt’), but he does not try to explain how the 
                                           
22 In Cat., 233D – 234A: «Habet autem dubitationem an ulla substantia ad aliquid dicatur, 
quemadmodum videtur, an hoc quidem contingit secundum quasdam secundarum 
substantiarum. Nam in primis quidem substantiis verum est; nam neque totae neque 
partes ad aliquid dicuntur; nam aliquis homo non dicitur alicuius aliquis homo, neque 
aliquis bos alicuius aliquis bos. Similiter autem et partes; quaedam enim manus non 
dicitur alicuius quaedam manus sed alicuius manus, et quoddam caput non dicitur 
alicuius quoddam caput sed alicuius caput. Similiter autem et in secundis substantiis, 
atque hoc quidem in pluribus; ut homo non dicitur alicuius homo, nec bos alicuius bos, 
nec lignum alicuius lignum sed alicuius possessio dicitur. Atque in huiusmodi quidem 
manifestum est quoniam non est ad aliquid; in aliquibus vero secundis substantiis habet 
aliquam dubitationem; ut caput alicuius caput dicitur et manus alicuius manus dicitur et 




previous thesis on the identification of substances and relative things matches 
Aristotle’s explicit refusal to consider the substances as relatives. Rather in 
the commentary Boethius keeps himself as close as possible to the text of 
Categories: 
 
We consider relative not simply what is said (relative to something), but what 
is (relative to something). Relatives are those things we consider in a kind of 
comparison and habit with others; for instance the quaternary number is said to 
be what it is, that is four, and something else, that is double, if we compare it 
with the binary number.23 
 
The double for Aristotle is an authentic relative, which meets the definition 
of relative according to which things whose being (and/or name) depends on 
something other are relatives. Boethius gives the example of the quaternary 
number, which is said to be a relative only in the less demanding sense of 
being put in relation with a binary number. The real question is that of the 
reference of a term like ‘double’. In the previous part of the commentary 
Boethius seemed to suggest that a number like four could be the terminal 
element of the series to which the relative /double/ belongs; he does not go 
beyond the text here, and limits himself to providing some clarifications (in 
addition to a faithful translation).  
The doubt expressed by Aristotle in Cat. 7, 8a, 20-30 (cf. supra) as to do with 
some species of the substance; for a possibly revised definition of relative, 
any substance should be definitely excluded from the category of relatives. 
Nothing is said about other species (such as /number/), but there is reason to 
believe they should be considered in the same way. Relative objects in a strict 
sense, i.e. those whose nature consists in being in a relationship with some-
                                           
23 In Cat., 235D: «non enim in eo quod est dici, ad aliquid consideramus sed in eo quod 
est esse; ea namque sunt relatiua, quae in quadam comparatione et relationis habitudine 
consideramus, ut quaternarius numerus, et hoc ipsum quod est esse dicitur, id est 




thing other, are similar to the double. The commentary on Categoriae does not 
contribute to the clarification of the problematic elements of the Aristotelian 
text; it seems to me that Boethius tries to say something new on relatives, and 





Aristotle characterizes qualities as something according to which things are 
said to be qualified (quales); Boethius introduces the issue in the following 
way: 
 
Since we wanted know what quality is, he supplies these pieces of infor-
mation: quality is what according to which things are said qualified. Actually 
he would be not less obscure and informative saying so rather than speaking of 
the quality itself. Indeed if those things which have a quality are qualified, in 
order to know if they are qualified, one must  first be acquainted with quality. 
More generally it does not matter that he says quality is what according to 
which things are said qualified, rather than quality is quality.24 
 
According to Boethius the issue raised here can be easily circumvented:  
white things are better known than whiteness, thus it is allowed to describe 
(not define) whiteness by utilizing the notion of white thing. What is more 
interesting for us is that a quality is said such because several bodies have it. 
Even if the discussion is on two different levels, the linguistic one, in which 
adjectives and abstract terms are distinct, and the ontological one, it is rather 
evident that the latter is the main one. 
                                           
24 In Cat., 239D – 240A: «Volentibus enim nobis quid sit qualitas scire, illa respondet 
qualitas est secundum quam quales quidam dicuntur. Nihil enim minus erit obscurius 
atque ignorabilius quod ait: secundum quam quales dicuntur, quam si de ipsa sola 
qualitate dixisset. Nam si illi sunt quales, qui qualitatem habent, ut sciantur quales, prius 
qualitas cognoscenda est. Amplius quoque nihil differt dixisse eam qualitatem secundum 




Another difficulty emerges with the geometrical qualities such as figures 
and shapes. Here is the passage: 
 
The fourth genus of quality is the form and figure of something; [...] the figure 
for instance is the triangle or square, the form of the figure is a certain quality 
[...] In a similar way we also say that men are shaped (form-having =formosos).  
The figure like being more beautiful or ordinary or something else, is called 
quality or form. Nobody doubts these are qualities. Like a thing is said to be 
figure-having (=figuratus) due to a figure, it is said form-having due to the form. 
More generally, the triangle too is said to be such due to the triangularity and 
the square due to the squareness. [...] The triangle and the surfaces are set 
among the continuous quantities, the surface itself is a quantity, the surface ar-
rangement is a quality. 25  
 
So, the triangle and the square have a certain form, or, as Boethius says, 
their figure is moulded in a certain way. In this case the explanation is not 
entirely intuitive; if we remember the canonical example of a qualified thing 
(what is said white due to its whiteness) we should say that the triangle is 
such since it has the triangularity form. This way of putting things opens a 
passage to a world inhabited by an infinity of strange creatures: together with 
the familiar humanity and whiteness, for many objects belonging to the 
category of substance, quantity and relation there would be a split between 
the thing indicated by the substantive and the one possibly indicated by the 
abstract noun, for example, in the case of relatives: /double/-/duplicity/, 
/great/-/greatness/, /servant/-/servitude/. Abstract objects such as geo-
metrical figures would not be counted twice, as, for instance, elements of 
                                           
25 In Cat., 250D – 251A: «QUARTUM VERO GENUS QUALITATIS EST FORMA ET CIRCA ALIQUID 
CONSTANS FIGURA; […] Est autem figura, ut triangulum uel quadratum, forma autem ipsius 
figurae quaedam qualitas est, […] unde etiam formosos homines dicimus. Figura enim 
quaedam uel pulchrior, uel mediocris, uel alio quodammodo constituta, qualitas formaque 
nominatur. Has autem esse qualitates nullus dubitat. Siquidem et a figura dicitur 
figuratus, et a forma formosus. Amplius quoque triangulum etiam a triangulatione 
denominatum est, et quadratum a quadratura. […] in continuae quantitatis speciebus et 
triangulum et superficies enumerata est, ipsa quidem superficies quantitas est, ipsius uero 




QUANTITY and QUALITY, but split into categorially different entities. Of course 
Boethius’ text can be interpreted differently: one can expect that a lover of 
desolate landscapes tries to hide these texts or force their reading, conversely 
a lover of ontological jungles, or a sceptical on ontological commitments 
deriving from the use of language, can try – perhaps with more probabilities 
of success - to maintain a literal interpretation. 
Having shown the ‘standard’ categorial entities, we will now consider the 
trans (extra)-categorial notions of form, matter, and essence, that seem to 





The distinction between forms and qualities is particularly interesting and, 
in my opinion, constitutes one point of tension of the Aristotelian-Boethian 
ordering. The use of the term ‘form’ in the context of the commentary on 
Categories is limited and apparently incidental; speaking of quantitative forms 
Boethius limits himself to saying, rather cryptically, that only ordinary quali-
ties are considered in the Categories; true science and ‘higher philosophy’ deal 
with other kinds of qualities. Apart from the passage just commented con-
cerning geometrical figures, in the commentary on Categories the term ‘form’ 
is contrasted with ‘matter’ when Boethius discusses the composition of first 
substances. The same use is found in the first commentary on Isagoge:  
 
A rather difficult passage follows, actually, more because of Victorinus’ trans-
lation than for what Porphyry says. (Porphyry) says that any corporeal thing 
consists of matter and form. In fact if we consider a statue, it appears to be 
made up of bronze and the figure the maker impressed in it; the matter of 
which it is made is bronze, the figure, i.e. the form, is that from which it is 




matter bronze. The same applies to genus. In fact genus is considered as matter, 
difference as form. As everything consists in matter and form, every species is 
composed of genus and difference. In fact, the genus of man is like the bronze 
of the statue, the difference of man is like the form through which the bronze is 
moulded. 26 
 
The Aristotelian example of the statue becomes a common place of medieval 
literature. A collateral use of the term ‘form’ can be found towards the end of 
the passage quoted, where Boethius speaks of composition (of the meaning) 
of the definition elements: the genus is considered as the matter to which the 
differential forms are joined. 
The term ‘form’ is not frequent in the second commentary too, and it seems 
to play different roles. I have made the following inventory: 
a. sometimes ‘form’ seems to have the meaning of ‘kind’.27 This suggests 
something more, i.e. a doctrinal conscious choice, but some caution should be 
exercised. 
b. Form as property: an example is an important passage where Boethius 
speaks of the presence of particular properties in particular things: «this 
                                           
26 BOETHIUS, In Isagogen, I, 94, 11-24 : «Sequitur locus perdifficilis sed transferentis 
obscuritate Victorini magis quam Porphyrii proponentis, qui huiusmodi est. Dicit omnem 
rem quaecumque est corporea, ex materia et forma constare. Namque si statuam dicas, 
constat statua ex aere uerbi gratia et figura illa quam ei suus fictor imposuit, et est materia 
ex quo facta est aeris, figura uero, id est forma, qua aes ipsum formatum est. Nam si 
hominem formabis ex aere, erit hominis forma, aes uero materia. Eodem modo etiam 
genus. Namque genus in modo materiae accipitur, differentia uero in modo formae. 
Etenim quemadmodum quaecumque illa res ex materia et forma consistit, sic etiam omnis 
species ex genere et differentia. Namque genus ita est hominis, ut est statuae aes, 
differentia uero sic est hominis, ut est forma illa ex qua aes effictum est». 
27 In Isag., II, 160, 23 – 161, 4 : «Duae quippe incorporeorum formae sunt (I would 
translate: there are two kinds or species of incorporeal things) ut alia praeter corpora esse 
possint et separata a corporibus in sua incorporalitate perdurent (ut deus, mens, anima); 
alia uero cum sint incorporea, tamen praeter corpora esse non possint (ut linea uel 
superficies uel numerus uel singulae qualitates).» It seems to me the same generic use is 
found in the text: «Animal igitur de pluribus praedicatur, homo uero, equus atque bos 
talia sunt, ut a se discrepent, nec qualibet mediocri re sed tota specie, id est tota forma suae 




white in this snow [...] cannot be predicated of any other white which is in 
this snow, as it is reduced to the singularity and forced to an individual form 
from the participation to an individual thing». 28 
c. An interesting, but I would say, unique use in the logical commentaries is 
that of ‘incorporeal nature’, if I interpret correctly the passage: «(the soul) 
separates, according to its ordinary capabilities, the incorporeal nature from 
the bodies, and lonely and pure – as it is form in itself – considers it». 29 
d. The form is also a composition principle (e.g. rationality for man) as op-
posed to the material principle (the stones for the house), and to the causal 
one (the father for the son). 30 
e. A use of ‘form’, perhaps connected with (b), is introduced in commenting 
a text by Porphyry: «species is also said of the aspect of a thing, in the sense 
in which it is said: “an aspect worthy of regality”».  
f. Boethius uses the term ‘form’ to speak of a second meaning of ‘species’ not 
considered by Porphyry: «(besides the aspect-form of a thing) there is the 
other species of substantial form which is called humanity, which is not 
                                           
28 In Isag., II, 184, 7-11: «Sed hoc album quod in hac niue […] non potest de quolibet alio 
albo praedicari quod in hac niue est, quia ad singularitatem deductum est atque ad 
indiuiduam formam constrictum est indiuidui participatione». 
29 In Isag., II, 165, 13-14: «Aufert, ut solet, a corporibus incorporeorum naturam et solam 
puramque ut in se ipsa forma est contuetur». The notion of nature is clarified in the 
Theological Treatises, in particular in the Contra Eutichen Boethius distinguishes three 
meanings of the term: in one sense ‘nature’ is said of corporeal things, in another of 
substances (corporeal and incorporeal), in the last of all things that are, as they can be 
understood by the intellect. 
30 Also in the second comment Boethius compares the composition of the matter  and 
form in the statue with the composition  of the genus and difference in the definition, and 
calls the latter ‘form and quasi-quality’: «Ita etiam in specie, quod est homo, materia 
quidem eius genus est, quod est animal, cui superueniens qualitas rationalis animal 
rationale, id est speciem fecit. Igitur speciei materia quaedam est genus, forma uero et 




subordinated to the animal, but shows the substance as the quality does».31 
The passage is not easy to understand. Prima facie one would say that Boe-
thius introduces here a kind of things which are difficult to arrange in the 
Aristotelian classification: ‘humanity’ is an abstract term derived from a 
common noun of substance. The same noun of substance, ‘man’, is utilized to 
signify the species, whatever it may be. Boethius is saying that the form 
humanity is not the species, more precisely is not what is subordinated to 
genus: «it is different from that kind of form which determines the division of 
the genus into parts». It is not completely clear to me if ‘species of substantial 
form’ (with an epexegetic use of the genitive) equals to ‘substantial form’; nor 
the exactly meaning of the statement that the form-species serves to deter-
mine the division of the genus into parts. The species in some sense is a ‘part’ 
of the genus, but is not what determines the division of the genus. Later in 
the same text things become more complicated: the same humanity is consid-
ered as both a species determining the substantial quality, and that which 
‘deduces itself in the participation of the animal and... forms the species of the 
genus’.  
I have the impression that the use of the term ‘form’ – as well as that of other 
technical terms by Boethius – is not completely coherent. In commenting 
Porphyry’s text, our author may have been tempted by the idea of consider-
ing the species as forms, the substantial qualities expressed by abstract nomi-




                                           
31 In Isag., II, 200, 7-16: «Alia est enim species substantialis formae quae humanitas nun-
cupatur, eaque non est quasi supposita animali, sed tamquam ipsa qualitas substantiam 




3. Form, being, what is, in the Theological Treatises 
 
In Chapter II of De Trinitate, Boethius speaks of forms considered by the 
different types of speculative philosophy: the science of nature deals with 
forms immersed in matter and in movement, mathematics deals with motion-
less forms making abstraction from the matter in which they are located, 
theology considers forms immobile and separated from matter. The text 
which we refer to ends as follows: «in naturalibus igitur rationabiliter, in 
mathematicis disciplinabiliter, in divinis intellectualiter versari oportebit 
neque diduci ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae vere 
forma neque imago est».32 Modern interpreters, including Rand and Obertel-
lo, link the ‘neque’ to the last sentence, which speaks about theological forms; 
it follows that all forms, apart from those of theology, are to be considered as 
images or pseudo-forms. The interpretation is confirmed by Boethius’ re-
marks on the fact that forms immersed in matter are not worthy of being 
called forms, but it does not seem to be so certain (see infra my comments on 
the text just quoted). 
The famous formula ‘omne esse ex forma est’ follows, which I would trans-
late ‘everything that is depends on form’. Boethius explains it as follows: 
indeed one says a statue is a reproduction of an animal not because of the 
bronze, which constitutes its matter, but the form which was impressed in the 
bronze; the bronze itself is not called ‘bronze’ for its matter, but for its config-
uration (figura)’. 33 One can obtain some clues to what forms are supposed to 
be from the following text: 
                                           
32 BOETHIUS, De Trinitate, 8, 16-20. 
33 Ibidem, 10, 20-26: «Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia, sed secundum 
formam qua in eo insignita est effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes non secundum 





.. The other forms (different from the divine form or from those considered by 
theology) are subject to accidents, like humanity, which does not accept acci-
dents as such, but as matter is subject to it; and indeed, while the matter subject 
to humanity receives accidents, it seems humanity itself receives them. Actually 
form without matter cannot be a subject, nor inhere in matter, otherwise, it 
would not be a form but an image. These forms which are in the matter and 
make (efficiunt) the body, come from those which are without matter. We shall 
be committing an abuse in calling forms the others in the bodies, as long as they 
are images.34 
 
The final clause: ‘dum imagines sint’ matches the one just quoted (‘sed 
potius ipsam inspicere formam quae vere forma neque imago est’). My im-
pression is that Boethius is saying that the materiated forms can be like the 
theological ones, without the matter in which they are currently immersed. If 
this indeed is the case, one would wonder if (the image of) humanity in re is 
something different from the archetypal form of humanity. It is an important 
point which can be traced in subsequent philosophical literature, for instance 
in Scotus Eriugena’s De Divisione Naturae. 
All forms, theological, mathematical and natural, have a predicative nature, 
thus they do not behave like subjects of predication. ‘Matter’ is said in differ-
ent senses: either as a material of construction (bronze), or as specific/general 
subject of predication (/animal/ is like the matter from which /man/ is 
built). If common nouns of substance refer to a substantial matter, the derived 
abstracts should refer to something different, except for homonymy35. On the 
ontological level we should find an object for ‘humanity’ different from that 
                                           
34 Ibidem,  10, 44-12, 54: «..ceterae formae subiectae accidentibus sunt ut humanitas, non 
ita accidentia suscipit eo quod ipsa est, sed eo quod materia ei subiecta est; dum enim 
materia subiecta humanitati suscipit quodlibet accidens, ipsa hoc suscipere videtur 
humanitas. Forma vero quae est sine materia non poterit esse subiectum nec vero inesse 
materiae, neque enim esset forma sed imago. Ex his enim formis quae praeter materiam 
sunt, istae formae venerunt quae sunt in materia et corpus efficiunt. Nam ceteras quae in 
corporibus sunt abutimur formas vocantes, dum imagines sint». 





for ‘man’. One can economize by interpreting forms like humanity as what 
properly corresponds to genera and species; in fact, Boethius suggested such 
possibility in the commentaries on Porphyry (e.g., In Isag. II, 200, cit.). In the 
present context the forms are not a subject of predication, if not in a second-
ary or relative sense, as building material. 
In the Quomodo substantiae36 we find the famous distinction between esse and 
id quod est: Boethius establishes the following axioms which should set the 
relationships between these ontological categories: 
1. being and what is are different; being itself is not yet, but what is, having 
received the form of being, is and subsists. 
2. What is can participate in something, but being cannot. There is participa-
tion when something is already, but something is when it participates in 
being. 
3. what is can have something else beyond what it is; the very being cannot 
have anything beyond itself. 
The text, by admission of the author, is rather obscure and lends itself to 
various interpretations. The being Boethius speaks about seems to have a 
predicative nature, and look like the meaning of a predicate such as ‘is an x’ 
(where x stands for a common noun); in this sense one understands how 
being cannot be a subject of predication. 37 
                                           
36 BOETHIUS, Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona, 
38 e ss. 
37 One must read the axiom together with the following one about the distinction be-
tween to be something and to be in eo quod est. The being of the second axiom is interpret-
ed by Gilbert Porretanus as being in eo quod. On the other hand the same author considers 
different possible interpretations, perhaps all the ones possible; I would be inclined to 
consider the being of the second axiom as (the meaning of) any predicate. It seems instead 





The term linked with ‘being’, ‘what is’, symmetrically appears as a subject of 
predication, that is as that which a term playing the role of subject in some 
way refers to. If we are here in the presence of a new categorization depends 
on how we interpret the text: for instance ‘what is’ could stand for the mean-
ing of a grammatical subject, that is for the concrete individuals, natural 
kinds, abstracts, non-existent things, properties. A narrow interpretation is of 
course possible, according to which ‘being’ refers to Aristotle’s traditional 
differential qualities, and ‘what is’ to substances. The road Boethius opens 
leads in different directions, some of which will be explored by medieval 
commentators. For our purposes it is sufficient to indicate the lexi-





The concept of essence plays a secondary role in the logical writings. In the 
commentary on Categories the term is used seldom, for instance in speaking of 
the fact that relative things, being given at the same time, in a certain sense, 
have a unique essence. In the commentaries on Porphyry I have not found 
much more than the following occurrences: 
 
One wonders if genera and species are truly subsistent things, and if in some 
way the essences and constant things are grasped by the intellect.38 
Differences, which divide the genus and give form to the species, since they 
complete the essence of the species, do not admit an increase or decrease.39 
 
                                           
38 In Isag., I, 25, 11-13: «Ita ergo nunc de generibus, speciebus et ceteris quaerunt, utrum 
haec vere subsistentia et quodammodo essentia costantiaque intellegatur». 
39 In Isag., II, 253, 2-4: «Differentiae quoque quae dividunt genus et informant speciem, 




In the first text Boethius speaks of essentia (= existent things?) object of intel-
lectual abstraction. The second text focuses on what corresponds in reality to 
the definition.  The species as essence would be constituted by the genus and 
difference. The rare and uncertain use of ‘essence’ leads to think that Boethius 
does not attribute this notion a precise role in the discussion of the Porphyri-
an problem. 
In the Contra Eutychen Boethius fills in a correspondence table between 
Greek and Latin expressions: 
 
Greece... has expressions corresponding to our ‘essence’, ‘subsistence’, ‘sub-
stance’, ‘person’: ‘ousia’ corresponds to ‘essence’, ‘ousiosis’ to ‘subsistence’, ‘ypos-
tasin’ to ‘substance’, ‘prosopon’ to ‘person’ [...] thus, man has an essence, i.e. an 
ousia, a subsistence, i.e. an ousiosis, a substance, upostasis, and a person, a proso-
pon. He has an ousia or essence because he is, an ousiosis or subsistence since he 
is not in any subject, an upostasis and substance as submitted to other things 
which are not subsistence, that is ousioseis. He is also a prosopon and a person 
because he is a rational individual. 40 
 
Boethius does not limit himself to translating technical terms from philo-
sophical Greek, but – what is more interesting for us – provides some exam-
ples of things classifiable under these concepts. ‘Having an essence’ can be 
said with different meanings; what Boethius says leads to distinguish be-
tween things that are: essences and substances. One may doubt whether the 
same things is called in two different ways, according to certain features, i.e. 
the fact of existing or presenting themselves as subjects of predication. 
In the De Institutione Arithmetica Boethius (Nicomacus) lists things ‘that are’: 
                                           
40 BOETHIUS, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, 88, 58 – 90, 87: «…Grecia… essentiam, 
subsistentiam, substantiam, personam, totidem nominibus reddit, essentiam quidem 
ousian, subsistentiam vero ousiosin, substantiam upostasin, personam prosopon appellans 
[…] Est igitur et hominis quidem essentia, id est ousia, et subsistentia, id est ousiosis, et 
upostasis, id est substantia, et prosopon, id est persona; ousia quidem atque essentia 
quoniam est, ousiosis vero atque subsistentia quoniam in nullo subiecto est, upostasis vero 
atque substantia, quoniam subest ceteris quae subsistentiae non sunt, id est ousioseis. Est 





We call beings those things that do not increase nor decrease, nor change their 
aspect, but maintain themselves grounded on their liveliness by support of their 
proper nature. These things are qualities, quantities, forms, magnitudes, small-
ness, equalities, habits, activities, dispositions, places, times, and all what is 
found in bodies. Such things are incorporeal by nature and, due to the immuta-
ble reasons of substance, they become mutable in adhering to bodies, [...]science 
supplies the knowledge of these things that are, in particular any one of those 
called ‘essences’. There are two kinds of essences, the continuous ones - whose 
parts are connected and not delimited, such as /tree/, /stone/ and all bodies of 
the world, which are properly named magnitudes - and the ones disjointed and 
delimited in their parts, [...] such as /flock/, /people/, /crowd/, /heap/ and 
anything whose parts are delimited and discrete. The latter are called multi-
tudes.41 
 
The plane of Aristotelian ontology is in some way overturned: the main 
actors here are not substances, but forms, and some of the things that are 
traditionally named ‘accidents’. Substances are relegated to the background, 
by some law of nature they can only receive formal determinations which 
downgrade them to changeable accidents. Nicomacus’ list poses a similar 
problem to that of Aristotelian bodies. Apparently substances, removed from 
the list of beings, re-enter, so to speak, through the window, as essences; 
indeed continuous essences with connected parts (trees, stones and ‘all the 
bodies of the world’) seem to be very close to Aristotelian second substances. 
                                           
41 BOETHIUS, De Institutione Arithmetica, 8, 1-23: «Esse illa dicimus quae nec intentione 
crescunt nec retractione minuuntur, nec variationibus permutantur, sed in propria semper 
vi suae se naturae subsidiis nixa custodiant. Haec autem sunt qualitates, quantitates, 
formae, magnitudines, parvitates, aequalitates, habitudines, actus, dispositiones, loca, 
tempora et quicquid adunatum quodammodo corporibus invenitur, que ipsa quidem 
natura incorporea sunt et immutabili substantiae ratione vigentia, partecipatione vero 
corporis permutantur […] Horum igitur, id est quae sunt, proprie quaeque suo nomine 
essentiae nominantur, scientiam sapientia profitetur. Essentiae autem geminae partes sunt, 
una continua et suis partibus iuncta nec ullis finibus distributa, ut est arbor, lapis et omnia 
mundi huius corpora, quae proprie magnitudines appellantur, alia vero disiuncta a se et 
determinata partibus […] ut grex, populus, chorus, acervus et quicquid quorum partes  
propris extremitatibus terminantur et ab alterius fine discretae sunt. His proprium nomen 




Continuous essences, as abstract particulars, can constitute the terminal 
elements of a separate category or intermediate species in the category of 
substance, between first substances and their proximal species. When we 
make an abstraction from individuals to obtain abstract quantitative particu-
lars, a deviation occurs from the line of ordinary abstraction, which allows us, 
for example, to obtain /man/ from Socrates preserving some of his individual 
features, such as being concrete. A constant ambiguity on the abstract nature 
of the universals is present in all the literature on Porphyry; the abstraction is 
driven from what we intend to obtain, in the case of quantities, a geometrical 




DIPARTIMENTO DI DISCIPLINE UMANISTICHE, SOCIALI E DELLE IMPRESE 
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